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1. See AUDRE LORDE, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110-13 (1984) (providing the origin of the
phrase “using the master’s tools”). This phrase refers to a continuing debate in the
feminist movement as to whether to work within the establishment or wholly outside
of it to achieve fundamental change and reform. This Comment will argue that
RICO, a tool designed to strengthen law enforcement, should be employed against
law enforcement officials and departments to punish misconduct and achieve
substantive reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The image captivated the world: more than a dozen Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) officers surrounding and beating African2
American motorist Rodney King. Following an automobile pursuit,
police first shocked King with a 50,000-volt stun gun and then
repeatedly struck him with nightsticks and kicked him about his head
3
and body. At the end of the beating, King’s skull was fractured in
eleven places, his ankle was broken, and he suffered internal injuries,
4
a burn on his chest, and even brain damage. Reportedly, King
pleaded for officers to stop while they continued assaulting him and
5
laughing. A bystander captured the scene on videotape and it was
6
broadcast worldwide. Charges were brought against four of the
7
officers who beat King. Even though all but one was acquitted on
8
criminal charges, many believed police misconduct rampantly

2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 199-200 (1998) (describing the extent of the
Rodney King beating).
3. See Alex Prud’Homme, Police Brutality! Four Los Angeles Officers are Arrested for a
Vicious Beating, and the Country Plunges Into a Debate on the Rise of Complaints Against
Cops, TIME, Mar. 25, 1991, at 16 (recounting details of the King beating).
4. See id. (describing the extent of King’s injuries).
5. See id. at 18 (reporting an eyewitness account of the beating).
6. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 200 (reporting on the worldwide
broadcast of the videotape beating of Rodney King).
7. See Seth Mydans, Officers in Beating Case File 30 Pretrial Motions, N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1991, at A23 (reporting that Sergeant Stacey Koon, and Officers Theodore
Briseno, Laurence Powell, and Timothy Wind faced charges stemming from the King
beating).
8. See A Jarring Verdict, An Angry Spasm, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter
Jarring] (discussing the verdict in the criminal trial of officers involved in the Rodney
King beating and the nationwide riots that it sparked); see also Adam Cohen et al.,
Gangsta Cops. As the L.A.P.D. Scandal Keeps Growing, a City Asks Itself, How Could the
Police Have Gone So Bad?, TIME, Mar. 6, 2000, at 31 (citing “the pervasive corruption
[of the LAPD] of the 1930’s and ‘40’s” as a factor in the lawlessness pervaded by
uncontrollable police officers).
Officer Laurence Powell and Sergeant Stacey Koon were later convicted in federal
court of violating Rodney King’s civil rights, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. See United
States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Ca. 1993) (detailing the district court
case against the officers). Section 242 prohibits a deprivation of civil rights under
color of law, and government’s equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also 18 U.S.C. § 242
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9

pervaded the Los Angeles force.
The acquittal of the officers heightened widespread resentment
10
and distrust of law enforcement in minority neighborhoods,
11
sparking deadly riots that left much of Los Angeles in ruin. The
criminal acquittal and its aftermath raised doubts not just about the
12
13
LAPD, but also about the ability of courts to punish errant officers.
These events prompted an official probe of the LAPD, with former
Secretary of State Warren Christopher chairing the investigative
14
15
commission. The “Christopher Commission,” as it became known,
scrutinized the LAPD’s training programs, recruitment efforts,
16
internal affairs, and citizen complaint mechanisms. Ultimately, it
17
found systemic problems within the department.

(1994 & Supp. 2000). On appeal, the minimal thirty month sentence each
defendant received was vacated. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the District Court improperly reduced the sentences and remanded the
case for resentencing. See United States v. Koon, 45 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1995)
(reversing and remanding to the District Court for improperly reducing Powell’s and
Koon’s sentences). Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding that the Ninth Circuit used the wrong standard of review and that the
District Court’s actions were partly improper. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81
(1996) (reporting the Supreme Court’s decision).
9. See WARREN CHRISTOPHER ET AL., REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 32 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION REPORT] (reporting findings of an inquiry commission, headed by
former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, investigating police misconduct
within the LAPD). The Christopher Commission Report also revealed a culture that
accepted excessive use of force. A police dispatcher who sent an ambulance to the
scene of the King beating said “he pissed us off, so I guess he needs an ambulance
now . . . should know better than run, they are going to pay a price when they do
that.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 200-01.
10. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 201 (commenting that the riots
demonstrated that African-Americans felt they were not treated fairly even when
apparent injustice is videotaped).
11. See id. (reporting that more than two thousand people were injured, and fifty
four were killed during the Los Angeles riots). Estimates on property damage from
the riots range from seven hundred million to nine hundred million dollars. Id.
(citing James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots, ETC PUBLICATIONS (1995)
(estimating 700 million dollars in damage); LOU CANON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE 347
(1997) (estimating 900 million)).
12. See Jarring, supra note 8 (discussing doubts about LAPD practices prompted
by the acquittal of the officers involved in King beating).
13. See All the World Lost Faith in the American Courts System, TIME, May 18, 1992, at
23 (reacting in part to the acquittal of the officers involved in the Rodney King
beating Time magazine quoted Muammar Qadhagfi saying “All the world lost faith in
the American courts system”).
14. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 201 n.11 (discussing the formation
of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department).
15. See id. at 201 (detailing the creation of the Christopher Commission).
16. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at Appendix (reprinting
Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley’s April 1, 1991 statement detailing the
responsibilities and scope of the Christopher Commission); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 2, at 201 n.11 (discussing Mayor Bradley’s charge to the
Christopher Commission).
17. See CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 32 (finding that
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Well before the King beating, the LAPD was aware of misconduct
by the officers involved in the King beating, and failed to adequately
18
address the issue. For example, Los Angeles paid $70,000 in a civil
19
settlement for injuries delivered by Officer Laurence Powell, one of
20
the officers involved in the King beating, yet he remained on the
force. Powell was not the only officer involved in the King beating
who had a similar history of civilian complaints and, likewise, avoided
21
dismissal.
A. Rampart Misconduct
A second scandal erupted in 1999, this time involving officers in
22
the Rampart CRASH unit. The “Rampart scandal” began with the
conviction of Rafael Perez, an undercover Rampart division officer,
on charges stemming from theft of illegal narcotics from police
23
evidence storage. As part of a plea agreement, Perez cooperated
with authorities, providing details of systemic misconduct within
24
Rampart’s elite anti-gang CRASH unit.
According to sworn
statements, Rampart officers regularly planted evidence, framed
suspects, committed perjury in court, and beat innocent civilians for
25
sport. In one incident, Rampart officers apparently framed and shot
26
nineteen-year-old Javier Francisco Ovando. Although released from
jail after Perez revealed the frame-up, Ovando spent two years in

misconduct in the department “is fundamentally a problem of supervision,
management and leadership”).
18. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 200 (noting that three of the four
officers indicted for the King beating had a history of citizen complaints for excessive
force).
19. See id. at 200 n.5 (discussing circumstances behind a prior civil judgment
against Officer Powell) (citing LOU CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE (1997)).
20. See Jarring, supra note 8 (reporting that Officer Powell was a criminal
defendant in the King beating trial).
21. See id. (reporting that Officer Theodore Briseno kicked and struck a
handcuffed suspect in 1987, resulting in a sixty day suspension).
22. CRASH is the anti-gang unit of Los Angeles’ Rampart division police
department.
The acronym stands for Community Resources Against Street
Hoodlums. See Cathy Booth, L.A.’s Bandits in Blue: A shocked city investigates charges that
its cops have lied, stolen and shot suspects for sport, TIME, Feb. 28, 2000, at 48 (reporting
on the Rampart scandal).
23. Bryan Robinson, Rampart Scandal Sparks Reviews—Public Defender: 30,000 Cases
to Be Reevaluated, ABCNEWS.com (Aug. 10, 2000), at http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/us/DailyNews/rampart000810.html (detailing the conduct that led to
reports of police misconduct). See generally Cohen, supra note 8 (providing an
overview of the Rampart scandal).
24. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 31-33 (detailing allegations inculpating dozens of
officers).
25. See id. (reporting alleged misconduct of Rampart officers).
26. See John Cloud & James Willwerth, L.A. Confidential, for Real Street Cops Accused
of Frame-Ups in Widening Scandal, TIME, Sept. 27, 1999, at 44 (reporting Perez’s
allegations and detailing Ovando’s story).
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prison, is paralyzed from the shooting, and may now face deportation
27
proceedings. Based on this scandal, and revelations such as those in
the Ovando case, almost one hundred convictions have been
28
overturned and the Los Angeles Public Defender has plans to review
an additional 30,000 convictions over the next several years to
29
identify cases tainted by Rampart.
30
The King and Rampart CRASH scandals heightened fears that the
LAPD’s misconduct remained unabated and underscored the
31
inability of traditional legal efforts to force change.
Apparent
confirmation that the LAPD is unable, or unwilling, to police itself
came in September 2000, when the city of Los Angeles entered into a
32
consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice. The decree
forestalled a lawsuit by the federal government over the pattern and
practice of police misconduct that even Los Angeles officials
33
34
acknowledge. While the consent decree imposes some reforms,
35
critics remain skeptical that it will solve the department’s problems.
In addition to criminal probes, the Los Angeles city attorney
expects hundreds of Angelenos to file federal civil suits, alleging
36
abuse at the hands of Rampart officers. Some believe this fury of

27. See id. (reporting the details of Ovando’s incarceration and release).
28. See Robinson, supra note 23 (reporting on the fallout of the scandal).
29. See id. (detailing the Los Angeles Public Defender’s reaction to the Rampart
scandal).
30. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing the allegations, including claims
that Rampart officers “frame[d] the innocent . . . smack[ed] around citizens on the
street for kicks . . . and perjure[d] themselves to get convictions”).
31. See infra notes 234-261 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of civil
recovery as a factor in the continuation of police misconduct).
32. See William Booth, Outsiders to Oversee Reforms at LAPD: Los Angeles’ Consent
Decree With Justice Dept. Will Avoid Federal Lawsuit for ‘Pattern of Misconduct’, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 2000, at A3 (reporting that Los Angeles entered a consent decree with the
Justice Department and providing details on the agreement); see also Tem Verdin, LA
Police Corruption Scandal Turns Uglier, ABCNEWS.com (Dec. 17, 2000), at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/lapd000315.html (discussing the
Los Angeles police chief’s refusal to cooperate with United States Attorney Gil
Garcetti in the Rampart probe).
33. See Booth, supra note 32 (reporting comment by Bill Lan Lee, then-director
of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, that “Police reform has been an
unfinished item on the Los Angeles agenda for almost a decade.”).
34. See Booth, supra note 32 (reporting that the reforms include: a computerized
database to monitor civilian complaints against officers; a data collection to answer
charges of racial profiling by LAPD officers; and the establishment of a special unit
to immediately investigate police shootings and other “serious use of force
incidents”).
35. See id. (quoting Los Angeles civil rights attorney Stephen Yagman, who
represents Louie Guerrero and approximately 100 other clients bringing suit against
the LAPD, stating that “[a]ny consent decree will be illusory and meaningless”).
Yagman cites the LAPD’s “authoritarian and outsider-adverse culture” as cause for
continued resistance to reform. Id.
36. See id. (covering the expected consequences of the Rampart scandal for the
city of Los Angeles).
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civil litigation and the re-opening of criminal cases may effectively
37
root out corruption and restore hope. However, given the startling
38
allegations of massive LAPD misconduct and the failure of past civil
39
litigation to halt abuse, new approaches are needed.
Civil suits against the LAPD, and police forces in general, are not
40
uncommon. Rodney King, for example, won a multi-million dollar
41
judgment against two of the officers who beat him. However, with
the potential reversal of hundreds of convictions due to the Rampart
42
scandal, Los Angeles now stares down the barrel of enormous civil
liability and may have to dip into funds from the 1998 tobacco
43
44
settlement to ante up.
The likely basis of most of these expected civil actions will be 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), the most common cause of action in suits
45
However, at least one pending case—Guerrero v.
against police.
46
Gates —is moving forward not just under § 1983 but also under the
civil arm of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
47
Act (“civil RICO”), a novel and potentially groundbreaking new

37. See id. (reporting Los Angeles Assistant Public Defender Robert Kalunian’s
comments that the goal of the litigation and conviction reviews are to provide justice
for the wrongly convicted and “to restore the public’s faith in the department”).
According to Kalunian, recently imposed limits on motions to suppress evidence
helped pave the way for the scandal in that the limits resulted in presentation of
evidence to the jury that was allegedly planted by the officers involved. Id.
38. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of the
problems in the LAPD).
39. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text (describing persistent lack of
reform within the LAPD).
40. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 201-02 (citing the Christopher
Commission Report noting that eighty-three civil damages cases stemming from
excessive force allegations were settled by the city in just five years).
41. See Millionaire of the Week, TIME, May 2, 1994, at 13 (reporting a jury award of
$3,816,535.45 in Rodney King’s civil suit against LAPD officers).
42. See Booth, supra note 32, at 48 (reporting that over 4,000 cases are under
review as a result of the Rampart scandal).
43. California receives $468 million annually as part of the 1998 national
settlement with tobacco companies. See Dan Morain, Record Davis Budget Relies on
Continued Prosperity, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A1 (discussing California’s tobacco
settlement expenditures).
44. See Booth, supra note 32 (projecting up to $400 million in liability for Los
Angeles stemming from police misconduct suits and noting Mayor Richard Riordan’s
call for using funds from the tobacco settlement to pay the fines).
45. See MICHAEL AVERY & DAVIS RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND
LITIGATION 1-5 (1995) (discussing prevalence of section 1983 suits addressing police
misconduct). For a discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its use in the police
misconduct context, see infra Part III.
46. See Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and holding that plaintiff has standing to plead RICO claim).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. 2000). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing
that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
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48

theory for such cases.

B. Guerrero v. Gates Breaks New Ground
Louie Guerrero filed suit against officers from the Rampart
division of the LAPD in U.S. District Court for the Central District of
49
California. He alleges Rampart CRASH Unit officers planted drugs
on him, used excessive force, filed false charges, and caused his
50
unlawful imprisonment.
He pleaded constitutional violations
51
pursuant to § 1983, among other causes of action. In itself, the §
1983 count, although based on the most massive police misconduct
52
scandal in the city’s history, is not particularly novel from a legal
53
However, Guerrero’s pleadings also include a civil
perspective.
54
RICO cause of action. As noted University of Southern California
law professor Erwin Chemerinsky commented, this new approach to
police misconduct litigation greatly increases the city’s potential
55
liability.
This novel use of civil RICO follows the continued expanded
application of RICO to defendants other than those involved in

district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit. . . .”). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (entire
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).
48. See Booth, supra note 32 (calling the decision that Guerrero can sue the
LAPD as a criminal enterprise, pursuant to civil RICO, “an unprecedented decision
against a law enforcement agency”); Rene Sanchez, L.A. Police Misconduct Likened to
Racketeering: Judge’s Order Could Widen City’s Liability, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2000, at A4
(calling Judge Rea’s decision in Guererro, allowing the suit to proceed under a civil
RICO theory, “unprecedented”); see also id. (reporting comments by noted law
professor Erwin Chemerinsky that the civil RICO cause of action in Guerrero is “a
novel theory”). While prosecutors do bring criminal RICO prosecutions against
corrupt officers, see infra notes 204-208 and accompanying text, no civil plaintiff has
thus far used RICO to win compensation for alleged police misconduct.
49. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Bernard Parks’ Motion to Dismiss at 1,
Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (No. 00-7165) [hereinafter
Plaintiff’s Opposition] (providing case number and forum information).
50. See id. at 1-2 (stating allegations of misconduct); see also Guerrero, 110 F.
Supp. 2d at 1291-92 (same).
51. See Plaintiff’s Opposition, supra note 49, at 1-2 (alleging that officers
unlawfully detained him, illegally searched him, planted narcotics on him, illegally
arrested him, and as a result, that he was falsely charged with a narcotics offense and
unlawfully incarcerated). Claims pursuant to § 1983 also include allegations of
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations stemming from officers’ use of
excessive force in arresting him. Id. at 3.
52. See Booth, supra note 32 (stating the Rampart allegations create the “biggest
police scandal ever” in Los Angeles).
53. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 45, at 1-5 (noting the increased utilization
of section 1983 to address police misconduct).
54. See Guerrero, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1292 (discussing RICO claims generally).
55. See Sanchez, supra note 48 (quoting Professor Chemerinsky saying, “[i]t’s a
novel theory, and it could tremendously expand the scope of the liability the city
could be facing.”). This increased liability is due to civil RICO’s treble damages
provision. See infra Part IV.C (discussing treble damages provision of civil RICO).
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56

organized crime, its original targets. The use of civil RICO to battle
the sort of persistent police misconduct evident in Los Angeles
57
follows logically from this continued expansion of the Act, even if
58
such use was never intended by the authors of the legislation.
This Comment argues that allowing a civil RICO cause of action for
59
plaintiffs such as Guerrero is appropriate and justified, especially
60
when courts have allowed suits to proceed under RICO theories that
61
are even more attenuated from original legislative intent. For the
purposes of this Comment, “police misconduct” refers to pervasive
62
patterns of behavior such as those evident in Los Angeles.
To understand how a law created to augment the government’s
63
enforcement arsenal can justifiably be turned against those it was

56. See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime
Control Act, Oct. 15, 1970, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970) (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 2000)) [hereinafter Organized Crime] (detailing
the legislative history of RICO, passed as Title IX of the OCCA of 1970); Dan A.
Naranjo & Edward L. Pina, Civil Rico: Overview on the Eve of the 200th Anniversary of the
Federal Judiciary, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 23, 24-27 (1989) (providing a brief overview of the
legislative history of RICO and reporting that the RICO statute was “approved . . . in
response to ineffective government efforts to stem the tide of organized crime”); see
also G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v.
Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-80 (1982) (providing a comprehensive review
of the Act’s legislative history).
57. See infra notes 185-203 and accompanying text (discussing expansion of
RICO). The reader will note that this Comment refers repeatedly to civil RICO,
criminal RICO, and RICO generally. Both the civil and criminal arms of RICO share
substantive definitions and prohibit the same activities. Further, criminal RICO case
precedents apply to civil RICO jurisprudence, and vice-versa. See infra notes 172-184
and accompanying text. To avoid confusion, I have specified the arm of RICO to
which I refer whenever possible. If neither criminal nor civil is specified, the analysis
applies generally to both branches of the Act.
58. See Naranjo & Pina, supra note 56, at 57 (arguing that the “primary purpose”
of RICO “was to facilitate criminal prosecutions of organized crime figures and to
prevent the infiltration of legitimate businesses by criminal elements”).
59. In making this argument, this Comment anticipates the courts may place
prudential limits on civil RICO as it extends into the police misconduct arena. Given
the cabining of section 1983 doctrine, see infra notes 220-259 and accompanying
text, many judges seem reluctant to allow broad leeway to plaintiffs in civil suits
against government entities and/or employees.
60. See generally id. (regarding the expansion of civil RICO since the RICO statute
was enacted in 1970). This expansion is not without controversy and division in the
circuits, however. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (commenting that the RICO statute has created “the
widest and most persistent circuit split on an issue of federal law in recent
memory.”).
61. See infra notes 185-202 and accompanying text (discussing RICO’s
expansion).
62. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text (describing misconduct by
police in Los Angeles). As discussed in Part I.B, to maintain a RICO cause of action,
certain elements that demonstrate a pattern of misconduct that runs afoul of the
specific acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 are required.
63. See Organized Crime, supra note 56, at 922 (stating “the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.”). While meeting all the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case is
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meant to serve (law enforcement), Part I closely examines civil RICO.
The statute’s origins and purpose are first discussed, followed by an
assessment of the elements of a RICO claim.
Part II examines how RICO’s reach now extends well beyond
targeting organized crime, with the Act commonly used in criminal
prosecutions outside the organized crime context, including cases
brought against police officers. Part II also discusses why plaintiffs
should follow the lead of prosecutors and employ civil RICO in suits
based on police misconduct.
Part III examines the failure of constitutional torts to eliminate
64
police misconduct. Specific burdens imposed upon the § 1983
plaintiff are discussed, as are other insufficiencies of § 1983, the most
65
Next, Part IV
common means to redress police misconduct.
discusses the hope that civil RICO provides to victims of police
misconduct and examines issues of requisite intent, statute of
limitations, and damage awards in civil RICO.
Part V considers a potential drawback of this use of civil RICO. It
examines reasons for limiting municipal liability under civil RICO in
accord with the curbs on liability that exist in the § 1983 context.
Finally, the Comment concludes that victims of police misconduct
should aggressively pursue civil RICO and develop a jurisprudence
that may promote true reform of troubled police forces. This
Comment argues that civil RICO can provide a useful tool in the fight
against police misconduct, carrying the potential to achieve
substantive reform where other remedies have failed.
I.

CIVIL RICO

This section examines Guerrero’s novel legal theory and its potential
for success. To understand the applicability of RICO to police
misconduct, the Act’s origin and purpose is scrutinized. The section
will conclude by examining potentially problematic RICO elements
and explaining how they can be met in the Guerrero context.

certainly the primary concern of plaintiffs, see infra Part I.B for a discussion of the
elements, legislative intent cannot be ignored when a law treads into new territory.
Accord Robert Force, The Curse of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.: The Mischief of Seeking
“Uniformity” and “Legislative Intent” in Maritime Personal Injury Cases, 55 LA. L. REV. 745,
745-48 (1995) (discussing the impact of legislative intent on the effort to provide
compensation for personal injuries in maritime law, when at common law no
wrongful death or survival cause of action existed).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
65. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 45 (observing that most civil suits alleging
police misconduct are federal suits pursuant to § 1983).
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A. RICO’s Origin and Purpose
Prompted by the insufficiency of existing law enforcement tools to
66
fight organized crime, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) was signed into law by President Richard
67
M. Nixon in 1970. Congress clearly asserted that the goal of RICO
was to empower law enforcement in the fight against organized crime
with more powerful legal tools and to provide new remedies for
68
injured parties.
Concerned that organized crime corrupts
69
legitimate enterprises and “democratic processes,” Congress enacted
70
Additionally, Congress specifically
an extremely broad statute.
71
called for liberal construction of the Act. RICO, therefore, seeks to
protect legitimate businesses and enterprises from corruption by
72
organized crime.
73
The conduct of Officer Powell and Sergeant Koon arguably
corrupted the LAPD by causing the public to lose faith in and even
74
resent the force. Likewise, the acts of Perez and other Rampart

66. See Blakey, supra note 56, at 249-53 (discussing “the origins of the ideas in
RICO”).
67. See 116 CONG. REC. 37,264 (1970) (reporting President Nixon’s signing of
RICO).
68. See Organized Crime, supra note 56, at 923:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime.”). Congress further explained, “organized
crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from . . .
gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation
and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of
social exploitation . . . .
Id. at 922-23.
69. See id. at 923 (expressing concern over the corrupting effect of organized
crime on legitimate businesses).
70. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (the RICO statute).
71. See Organized Crime, supra note 56, at 947 (stating that RICO “shall be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes”).
72. See United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (stating
that RICO is meant to prevent illegal activities from corrupting legitimate businesses
and unions), rev’d on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Wesley
Kobylak, Annotation, Civil Action for Damages under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(C) of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.) for
Injuries Sustained by Reason of Racketeering Activity, 70 A.L.R. FED. 538, 544 (1984)
(stating that RICO is designed to prevent organized crime from invading and
corrupting legitimate business enterprises).
73. See Prud’Homme, supra note 3 (providing details of the King beating); see also
United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774-80 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (subsequent history
omitted) (providing findings of fact in trial of Koon and Powell for federal civil rights
violations).
74. See Jarring, supra note 8 (discussing the explosion of rage after the criminal
acquittal of officers involved in the King beating).
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75

officers infiltrated the otherwise legitimate LAPD. Given RICO’s
purpose of protecting legitimate enterprises from criminal
76
corruption, the LAPD officers’ behavior is an appropriate RICO
77
target.
B. The Elements: Meeting the Threshold
Regardless of how broadly the courts may interpret civil RICO,
plaintiffs must, of course, meet specific elements to proceed under
78
RICO. Generally, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in her
79
business or property as a result of racketeering activities as defined
80
81
in the Act. A person violates § 1962 of the RICO statute when she

75. See Cohen, supra note 8 (reporting the revelations of misconduct in the
Rampart division).
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (establishing RICO’s purpose of
protecting legitimate organizations from criminal corruption).
77. Note that a civil RICO action in the King case likely cannot prevail, as assault
and battery, and even section 1983 violations of constitutional rights, do not in
themselves constitute “racketeering activity” as defined in section 1961(1) of the
RICO act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (defining racketeering
activity); see also Part I.B. If the officers obstructed justice or obstructed the criminal
investigation into the incident, such acts might provide a basis for a civil RICO
action, if all other elements of a RICO violation are present. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating that obstruction of justice and
obstruction of criminal investigations can constitute racketeering activity); see also
infra Part I.B (discussing RICO elements and applying them to the police misconduct
context). The King case is used in this Comment, however, as an illustration of the
impact that high-profile police brutality cases have on the nation and on the
departments that employ errant officers.
78. See Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating
that “[a] violation of § 1962(b) requires: (1) acquisition or maintenance of (2) an
interest in or control of (3) any enterprise (3) [sic] through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity”) (citing Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627
F. Supp. 1290, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1986)); Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746
(9th Cir. 2000) (stating, “[a] violation under [18 U.S.C.] section 1962(c) requires
proof of: ‘1) conduct 2) of an enterprise 3) through a pattern 4) of racketeering
activity’”) (citing Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000); Howard, 208 F.3d at 751 (stating that “[t]o establish a
violation of section 1962(d), plaintiffs must allege either an agreement that is a
substantive violation of RICO or that defendants agreed to commit, or participated
in, a violation of two predicate offenses”) (citation omitted).
Generally, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of section 1962, which sets forth
activities prohibited by RICO, to employ section 1964, which provides a private cause
of action to individuals harmed by RICO violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994)
(listing prohibited activities); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing
definitions for the chapter).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating civil RICO elements);
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (defining racketeering). Section 1961(1)
provides:
As used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 1961 et seq.]—
(1) “racketeering activity” means
(a) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a
controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the
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Controlled Substances Act [21 USCS § 802]), which is chargeable under
State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(b) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title
18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224
(relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if
the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating
to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and
related activity in connection with identification documents), section 1029
(relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices),
section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section
1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section
1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the
procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426
(relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers),
section 1427 (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers),
sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law
enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or
an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim,
or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and
use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport),
section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud
and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581-1588
(relating to peonage and slavery), section 1951 (relating to interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering),
section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),
section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section
1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived
from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate
commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), sections 2251,
2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections
2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of
stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for
phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or
packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section
2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A
(relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to
trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321
(relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts),
sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections
2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),
(c) an act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds),
(d)any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a
case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the
felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling,
or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 USCS § 802]),
punishable under any law of the United States, any act which is indictable
under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, or
(e) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
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82

connected to creating,
engages in a racketeering pattern
83
controlling, or acquiring an enterprise used for racketeering. As
84
RICO is a novel theory for police misconduct cases, this Comment
next discusses the requirements for RICO injury, defines RICO
pattern, discusses the applicability of RICO enterprise to the police
misconduct context, and explains how police misconduct affects
interstate commerce. It is important to note that while the civil and

section 274 [8 USCS § 1324] (relating to bringing in and harboring certain
aliens), section 277 [8 USCS § 1327] (relating to aiding or assisting certain
aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 [8 USCS § 1328] (relating
to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such
section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain . . .
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994) (listing prohibited activities). Section 1962
provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a
principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open
market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling
or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so,
shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held
by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their
accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer,
either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the
issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id.
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (listing prohibited activities).
82. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1989)
(explaining RICO pattern element); Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 855
F.2d 241, 242 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating “(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of
racketeering activity (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or
control of an enterprise” violates RICO) (emphasis in original); see also Naranjo &
Pina, supra note 56, at 28-29 (discussing the statutory elements of civil RICO).
83. See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 232 (explaining the requirement of using or
investing racketeering income “to acquire an interest in or to operate an enterprise
engaged in interstate commerce”); Delta Truck, 855 F.2d at 243-44 (discussing the
requisite nexus between allegedly illegal activity and RICO enterprise).
84. See sources cited supra note 48.
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criminal arms of RICO share much, a defendant need not be
85
86
convicted under criminal RICO to face a § 1964 suit.
1.

Cognizable injury
Civil RICO entitles a plaintiff to damages only from an injury to
87
“business or property” An injury to business or property is distinct
88
89
from personal injuries, for which RICO provides no relief. Caselaw
demonstrates, however, that pecuniary loss resulting from personal
injuries caused by racketeering may constitute “self-evident injury” in
90
a RICO case.
Therefore, when personal injuries lead to, for
example, loss of income due to missed work, courts are willing to
allow a RICO theory to proceed. In such a case, the plaintiff’s injury
is his pecuniary loss resulting from injury and inability to work and
not his actual physical injury.
Given these precedents and the Supreme Court’s statement that
91
RICO is to be liberally construed, a victim of police misconduct
appears to be in a strong position to claim cognizable injury under
RICO. However, the plaintiff must specify that the claim is for
pecuniary losses associated with personal injuries and not for
92
personal injuries themselves.

85. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (the RICO section which
provides a civil cause of action to persons injured by activities prohibited by the act).
86. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985) (holding that
civil RICO suit does not require a prior criminal RICO conviction or conviction of
predicate acts stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a)); see also Berg v. First Am. Bankshares,
Inc., 796 F.2d 489, 502 (D.C. 1986) (holding dismissal below improper because civil
RICO action does not demand prior criminal conviction for predicate acts forming
cause of action in complaint).
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating a RICO claim lies if the
plaintiff is “injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962”).
88. See Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir.), reh’g denied en banc, 851
F.2d 1423 (11th Cir.) (holding that “the phrase ‘injured in his business or property’
excludes personal injuries” and that a civil RICO action is distinct from a wrongful
death action).
89. Oscar v. Univ. Students Coop. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.) (holding
“personal injuries are not compensable under RICO”).
90. See Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1170 (3d Cir. 1989)
(stating “loss of earnings, benefits and reputation constitute self-evident injury”)
(cited in Plaintiff’s Opposition, supra note 49, at 5); accord Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626
F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating income loss can be cognizable under
RICO).
91. Accord Callan v. State Chem. Mfg. Co., 584 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(stating that civil RICO’s language is clear and unambiguous and therefore it is
inappropriate for the court to restrict its application beyond the plain meaning of
the language Congress enacted); Kobylak, supra note 72, at 595 (discussing Callan
and similar cases refusing to restrict RICO beyond the plain meaning of the language
enacted).
92. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 521 (1985) (stating RICO
provides no recovery for personal injuries); see also Annette M. Sansone, Annotation,
Recovery of Damages for Personal Injuries in Civil Action for Damages Under Racketeering
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Faced with a motion to dismiss for want of cognizable injury,
93
Guerrero successfully argued that his loss of employment due to
injuries at the hands of Rampart officers constituted an injury to
94
business and was, therefore, cognizable under civil RICO. Ruling in
Guerrero’s favor, Judge Rea observed that pecuniary losses associated
95
with personal injuries are compensable under civil RICO and cited
96
agreement among numerous federal districts and circuits.
2.

Pattern
Even given a cognizable injury, the plaintiff must also demonstrate
97
98
that a “pattern of racketeering activity” exists. RICO § 1961(1)(A)
specifies racketeering activity as “any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping . . . bribery, extortion . . . or dealing in a controlled
99
substance” and § 1961(1)(B) includes obstruction of justice,
obstruction of criminal investigations, tampering with or retaliating
against a witness, victim, or informant on the list of racketeering
100
activities.

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C.S. § 1964(c)), 96 A.L.R. FED. 881,
886-89 (1990) (discussing various personal injury cases dismissed for lack of
cognizable RICO injury).
93. See Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (denying
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss).
94. See Plaintiff’s Opposition, supra note 49, at 5-6 (providing Guerrero’s
argument), citing Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (D. Mass. 1986)
(holding plaintiff’s sexual harassment and discrimination claim that “defendants’
actions forced her out of her job as a carpenter and disabled her from pursuing such
work in the future” constituted a cognizable claim under civil RICO); Rodonich v.
House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 627 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
that lost income constitutes “sufficient proprietary damage” for civil RICO claim).
95. See Guerrero, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (stating that “pecuniary losses associated
with personal injuries caused by racketeering” are cognizable injuries pursuant to
civil RICO).
96. See id. (citing, among other authorities, Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Libertad v. Welch, 53
F.3d 428, 437 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995); Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F. Supp. 963,
968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (commenting that if murder victims had survived and been
disabled, they “presumably” could assert a RICO claim for lost business earnings);
von Bulow v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that a
comatose victim of a murder attempt may have compensable damages under RICO
for loss “of her committee and her inability to enjoy her personal and real
property”); Hunt v. Weatherbee, 626 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (D. Mass. 1986)
(allowing lost wages recovery under RICO by victim of sexual harassment and
discrimination)).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1994) (stating prohibition on gains coming from
“a pattern of racketeering activity”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000)
(providing private civil right of action to persons injured by racketeering activity, as
prohibited in section 1962 of the act); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000)
(defining “racketeering activity”).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
100. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(B) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (defining racketeering
activity).
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A pattern is established by first demonstrating a minimum of two
101
racketeering acts in a ten-year period. Additionally, some common
102
scheme, plan, or motive must connect the acts. A pattern cannot,
103
Furthermore,
therefore, merely be a series of disconnected acts.
repetitive acts against a single victim within a small time frame do not
104
establish a RICO pattern, as RICO demands an ongoing design.
Such ongoing design requires the acts be sufficiently different but
105
Isolated improper acts are not enough to sustain a
still related.
106
RICO claim.
Generally, to establish a RICO pattern, the plaintiff
107
must show a threat of continuing activity or a close period of
108
repeated conduct, although the latter showing may invite greater
109
scrutiny by the court.
110
Because the predicate acts of racketeering need not be overt,
establishing a pattern is easier than it appears at first blush. A police
officer’s forbearance from arresting drug dealers, when receiving
drugs in return, can establish racketeering activity and the officer’s

101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating requirements for RICO
pattern); see also Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2000)
(observing that at least two racketeering acts within a ten-year period must occur to
establish a pattern), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828, 121 S. Ct. 77 (Oct. 2, 2000); see also
Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 420 (7th Cir.
1988) (holding that a single, isolated transaction does not meet RICO pattern
requirement).
102. See Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.C. 1984)
(holding pattern requires at least two acts connected by a common scheme, plan, or
motive).
103. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(commenting that series of disconnected acts not sufficient to establish “pattern”
under RICO), aff’d, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. See Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 646 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D.
Del. 1986) (holding that close similarity of predicate acts can preclude a finding of
ongoing design).
105. See id. (stating requirement of interrelatedness of acts).
106. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining
that predicate acts must “threaten to be more than an isolated occurrence”).
107. See Pitts v. Turner & Boisseau, Chartered, 850 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir. 1988)
(holding threat of continuing activity is required for RICO pattern, and that scheme
towards one single objective is insufficient even if it involves multiple acts, because
the scheme ends when the actor accomplishes its underlying purpose); see also
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (commenting that
RICO’s legislative history dictates that the Act was not meant for the “isolated
offender” or “sporadic activity”).
108. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1989) (holding
RICO pattern established by existence of “closed period of repeated conduct” or
threat of continuing activity). But see W. Assoc. Ltd. v. Mkt. Square Assoc., 235 F.3d
629, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding plaintiff failed to establish RICO pattern based on
closed period of repeated conduct).
109. See Western, 235 F.3d at 634-36 (explaining RICO pattern precedent).
110. See United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming
criminal RICO conviction of officer for refusing to enforce the law).
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111

refusal to arrest the dealers can form the requisite pattern.
In the Guerrero case, establishing a pattern based on police
112
misconduct is indeed possible. Officers within the Rampart division
of the LAPD, for example, have allegedly committed hundreds of
113
These alleged acts, such as
criminal acts over the last decade.
114
planting incriminating evidence on citizens, filing false police
115
116
reports, false arrest of citizens, and stealing drugs from police
117
evidence lockers, appear part of a common scheme.
118
By demonstrating pursuant to § 1962 that Rampart officers
received income (e.g., their salary) directly or indirectly from
participating in such a racketeering pattern, Guerrero can meet this
threshold element. As similar allegations of pervasive misconduct
119
have been directed at other major metropolitan forces,
maintainable actions may exist in many areas of the country.
Considering the Rampart scandal encompasses nearly a decade of
120
alleged misconduct, there appears a serious threat of continuing
activity. Additionally, even though RICO requires multiple acts and
121
continuing activity, an action based on a single scheme is possible,
122
albeit difficult to maintain.
Proving a pattern of racketeering
activity, however, does not in itself prove the existence of a RICO
123
enterprise.

111. See id. (affirming criminal RICO conviction of police officer for furthering
drug trafficking by not arresting drug dealers in exchange for receipt of drugs).
112. See Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (allowing
the suit to proceed under a civil RICO theory).
113. See Booth, supra note 32 (discussing allegations of abuse).
114. See id. (reporting alleged misconduct).
115. See id. (detailing allegations in Rampart scandal).
116. See Cohen, supra note 8 (reporting allegations that Rampart officers took
citizens into custody under false pretenses).
117. See supra note 23 (reporting Perez’s theft of drugs from evidence storage).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
119. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 178-98, 235-383 (detailing
allegations and evidence of police misconduct in Atlanta, Ga.; Boston, Mass.;
Chicago, Ill.; Detroit, Mich.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Minneapolis, Minn.; New Orleans,
La.; New York, N.Y.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Portland, R.I.; Providence, R.I.; San Francisco,
Cal.; and Washington, D.C.).
120. See Cohen, supra note 8 (reporting the scope of the Rampart scandal).
121. See Hill v. Equitable Bank, 655 F. Supp. 631, 652 (D. Del. 1987) (holding
where predicate acts within a single scheme are sufficiently different and ongoing,
there can be a violation of RICO); Tri-Cont’l Leasing Corp. v. Cicerchia, 664 F. Supp.
635, 640 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that continuity requirement of RICO pattern can
be established by a single scheme); Bush Dev. Corp. v. Harbor Place Assoc., 632 F.
Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D. Va. 1986) (holding that even though there was only one
scheme to defraud, alleged acts of mail fraud satisfied “pattern” element of RICO).
122. See Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260,
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (commenting that existence of “single scheme, single injury,
and few victims . . . makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to state a RICO claim”).
123. See United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1094 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that pattern does not necessarily prove existence of an enterprise).
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3.

Enterprise
RICO defines enterprise very broadly, including legal entities and
124
125
126
Labor unions, corporations, and even
informal associations.
127
individuals can fit the definition. The definition remains silent on
128
While the Supreme
the applicability to state and local entities.
129
Court has not specifically addressed this definitional issue, nearly all
lower federal courts agree that state and local entities can constitute
130
enterprises under RICO.
131
In United States v. Freeman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit explicitly followed the seven federal circuits that
previously held government entities can satisfy the enterprise element
132
of RICO.
Further, the court emphasized the enterprise need not
benefit economically from the racketeering activity, as long as
133
pecuniary gain motivated the predicate acts.
Criminal RICO
134
135
enterprises can include state and local police departments and

124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating, “‘enterprise’ includes
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”).
125. See United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1982)
(finding labor union to be RICO enterprise).
126. See United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1120 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
corporation an appropriate enterprise under RICO).
127. See von Bulow v. von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
an individual can constitute a RICO enterprise). See generally Thomas S. O’Neill,
Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646, 656 (1989)
(discussing the breadth of allowable RICO enterprises).
128. See Ellen S. Podgor, State and Local Entities as RICO Enterprises: A Matter of
Perception, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 853, 854-56 (1996) (discussing whether state and local
entities can be enterprises for RICO purposes and providing details on conflicting
authority on the subject).
129. See id. (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue).
130. See id. at 858 (citing agreement on the topic among the vast majority of
federal circuits). In relatively early RICO jurisprudence, a court ruled the City of El
Paso a RICO enterprise. See United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1198 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding “the term ‘enterprise’ . . . is broad enough to include a
municipal court which is one part of the city government”). But see United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020-22 (D. Md. 1976) (stating state and local enterprises
can constitute RICO enterprises), rev’d on other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.
1976), vacated on other grounds, 602 F.2d 653 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980).
131. 6 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1993).
132. See Freeman, 6 F.3d at 597 (noting its holding is in accordance with seven
federal circuits).
133. See id. at 597 (holding the economic motive must come from either the
enterprise or the predicate acts). The court cited various federal circuit cases
holding the same, including: United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 58-65 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 1988).
134. Both the civil and criminal arms of RICO share definitions and are subject to
similar interpretation by the courts. See Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 164
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding caselaw from criminal RICO applies to civil RICO).
135. See United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 882-83 (6th Cir. 1983) (county
sheriff’s office RICO enterprise); United States v. Kovic, 684 F.2d 512, 516 (7th Cir.
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136

local prosecutor offices.
One significant hurdle in meeting the RICO enterprise element is
137
the operation-or-management test introduced in Bennett v. Berg and
138
This test requires the
elucidated in Reves v. Ernst & Young.
defendant be associated with the racketeering enterprise and
139
participate in the conduct of its affairs. The court in Reves held the
140
of an accountant who prepared fraudulent
gross misconduct
reports for a Farmer’s Cooperative did not pass the Bennett operation141
or-management test. Because the accountant had no role, direct or
indirect, in conducting the Cooperative’s affairs, his misconduct
142
remained outside the scope of RICO.
While the operation-or-management test may eliminate potential
defendants who hold non-managerial positions within the target
143
enterprise, the problem does not preclude a claim against officers
144
within a police department. In United States v. Ruiz, the court held
defendant police officer’s “illegal activities were clearly helped along
145
Further, the
by the authority vested in him as a police officer.”
court commented that circumstantial evidence can establish the
requisite nexus between the predicate racketeering acts and the
146
enterprise.
A police officer can, therefore, participate in the
147
operation or management of the police department by using the
police powers bestowed upon him by the department (i.e.,

1982) (Chicago city police department constitutes RICO enterprise).
136. See United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 239 (7th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor’s
office held RICO enterprise); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980)
(same).
137. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.).
138. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
139. See id. at 183-85 (explaining and applying the operation-or-management test).
140. The court referred to the accountant’s “reprehensible acts.” Arthur Young &
Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1324 (8th Cir. 1991), aff’d sub nom., Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
141. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 185 (holding conduct not actionable under RICO).
142. See id. at 186 (describing his conduct within the enterprise). Accord Ira
Raphaelson & Michelle Bernard, RICO and the “Operation or Management” Test: The
Potential Chilling Effect on Criminal Prosecutions, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 669, 686-89 (1994)
(discussing the result in Reves and generally addressing the operation-ormanagement test).
143. Because, like the accountant in Reves, they lack the ability to effect the
conduct of the enterprise.
144. 905 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1990).
145. Id. at 504.
146. See Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 504 (discussing requirements to establish nexus between
predicate acts and enterprise).
147. See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that for a
RICO violation to lie, the defendant must demonstrate “some participation in the
operation or management of the enterprise itself”). See generally Raphaelson &
Bernard, supra note 142 (providing a detailed discussion of the operation-ormanagement test and recent applications of it).
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While decided three years prior to Reves,
“enterprise”) itself.
Ruiz’s logic establishing the nexus between the predicate acts and the
enterprise remains untouched by the later U.S. Supreme Court
150
decision in Reves. Confirming this view, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit recently examined Reves and commented that the
case dealt only with necessary conduct for parties outside the alleged
151
RICO enterprise. The holding of Reves, therefore, is inapplicable to
the police misconduct setting, when the defendant “person” is
152
directly employed by the RICO enterprise.
However, while a government entity, such as the LAPD, can
constitute a RICO enterprise, it cannot be a named defendant in a
RICO suit as it cannot form the intent required for a RICO
153
violation.
In fact, even illegal enterprises are inappropriate RICO
defendants, as a civil plaintiff can sue only the person(s) and not the
154
enterprise itself. In Guerrero, the named plaintiffs include chiefs of
police, members of the Board of Police Commissioners, city council

148. Accord Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 504 (discussing the power inherent in “the reactions
(fear and timorousness in some instances) which a police officer, uniquely, has the
ability to engender in others by virtue of his position”) (emphasis added). It is the very
position within the establishment itself, therefore, that necessarily enables a police
officer to participate in the “operation or management” of the police department as
a whole.
149. 1990 and 1993, respectively.
150. See generally Reves, 507 U.S. 170 (applying the operation or management test
to a complicated financial arrangement and not to an “officer” within a targeted
enterprise). The term “police officer” in fact is important as it demonstrates an
authority to carry out operations of the police department. See Raphaelson &
Bernard, supra note 142, at 690-95 (arguing that Reves was wrongly decided and
providing an overview and analysis of Justice Souter’s dissent).
151. See United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Reves and holding it “does not apply where a party is determined to
be inside a RICO enterprise”) (internal citation omitted) (citing United States v.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1298-99 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d
61, 68 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1105 (1996); United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 751 (1st Cir. 1994)).
152. Accord Owens, 167 F.3d at 754 (holding Reves inapplicable to parties within the
alleged RICO enterprise).
153. See Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding RICO suit against municipal corporation cannot be
maintained because “government entities are incapable of forming a malicious
intent” for the predicate acts that must constitute a RICO violation); Pedrina v.
Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of city entity from
RICO action because of inability to form requisite malicious intent). The reader will
note that while there is no separate intent requirement in the RICO act, a showing of
intent to commit the predicate racketeering acts is still required.
154. See Kobylak, supra note 72, at 550 (observing, “even if the enterprise is an
illegal enterprise, the civil plaintiff can sue only the ‘person’ and not the ‘enterprise’
for damages suffered from the racketeering activity.”) (citations omitted). The
Annotation, id., also notes courts have dismissed complaints when plaintiffs sued the
enterprise rather than the individual RICO violators (citing Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill.), withdrawn, rereported, 548 F. Supp. 20
(N.D. Ill. 1982)).
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155

members, members of the City Attorney’s Office and more than
156
100 current or former members of the LAPD.
Finally, a plaintiff, or prosecutor, must establish a nexus between
157
Establishing the
the predicate acts and a lawful RICO enterprise.
nexus requires three elements: (1) the defendant committed the
predicate acts; (2) doing so was facilitated by his position within the
enterprise; and (3) the enterprise felt the effect of the commission of
158
said acts. The effect of the racketeering acts on the enterprise may
159
be either direct or indirect, and the enterprise need not benefit
160
161
In United States v. Blackwood, a police officer’s
from them.
attempts to influence the outcome of traffic court cases sufficiently
162
satisfied the nexus between acts and enterprise. With Blackwood’s
163
criminal conviction affirmed, the nexus requirement is not a
barrier to RICO suits for police misconduct. Similarly, if the
allegations in Guerrero prove accurate, Rampart officers: (1)
committed acts that fall within the definition of RICO predicate acts;
(2) those acts were facilitated by the officers’ position in the LAPD as
police officers and as members of the elite Rampart CRASH unit; and
(3) the acts damaged the reputation and effectiveness of the LAPD by
exposing its officers to civil liability and eroding public trust in the
force.
4.

Affecting interstate commerce
Finally, to show a RICO violation, the plaintiff must prove that the
164
enterprise engaged in or affected interstate commerce.
Minimal
165
acts of interstate commerce satisfy this requirement. Sufficient acts

155. See Plaintiff’s Opposition, supra note 49, at 1-5 (naming defendants).
156. See id. at 2-5. Of course, suing governmental officials raises qualified
immunity issues, which are neither lessened nor exacerbated by RICO. See Chappell
v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that in passing RICO, Congress
did not intend to abrogate legislators’ immunity).
157. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1983)
(modifying the then-existing formulation for establishing a nexus between predicate
acts and RICO enterprise and establishing a new test for the nexus).
158. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 (explaining the new test).
159. See id. at 1333 n.24 (stating either direct or indirect effect on the enterprise is
enough).
160. See United States v. Webster, 669 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1982) (explaining
proof that RICO enterprise benefited from the acts or that they “advanced the affairs
of” the enterprise is not required); see also Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333 n.24 (same, citing
Webster).
161. United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1985).
162. See Blackwood, 768 F.2d at 131 (holding nexus satisfied).
163. See id. at 139 (stating conviction is affirmed).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (stating the enterprise must be
“engaged in” interstate or foreign commerce or its activities must “affect” the same).
The same language is repeated in § 1962(b) and (c).
165. See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
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include travel out of the enterprise’s home state, purchasing
167
equipment manufactured in another state, and placing or receiving
168
interstate telephone calls.
As one commentator observed, “courts
have engaged in little more than sheer conjecture to determine that
169
the [interstate commerce] element is present.”
In Guerrero, defendants’ motion to dismiss did not even raise a
challenge based on RICO’s “affecting interstate commerce”
170
Police departments most certainly perform the
requirement.
171
minimal acts held to satisfy this element.
A suit for police
misconduct, therefore, is unlikely discouraged by the “affecting
interstate commerce” requirement.
II. HONING THE TOOL
Understanding the applicability of RICO to police misconduct
requires an examination of the scope of both the criminal and civil
arms of the statute. This section examines the breadth of criminal
RICO and demonstrates how victims of police misconduct can
fashion a new civil remedy from existing RICO caselaw. As courts
give prosecutors broad leeway to cast the RICO net far and wide, this
section argues that consistency demands that plaintiffs be afforded

RICO only requires a “minimal effect” on interstate commerce); United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979) (same); see also United States v. Barton, 647
F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); Timothy Patton, Civil RICO: Statutory and Implied
Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 377, 413 (1983) (discussing
the affecting interstate commerce requirement and observing that “the nexus of the
enterprise to interstate commerce” need only be minimal).
166. See United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also Patton, supra note 165, at
413 n.198 (citing these cases).
167. See United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding interstate
commerce requirement satisfied by purchase of goods manufactured out of state);
United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 8 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding phone calls made
from one state to another as interstate commerce).
168. See Altomare, 625 F.2d at 8 (finding out-of-state phone calls satisfy interstate
commerce requirement).
169. Louis Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A
Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201,
240 (1981) (citing United States v. Frumento, 426 F. Supp. 797, 803 n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1976); United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d mem., 605
F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa.
1977)).
170. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint for Failure to
State a Claim for Relief at 6-7, Guerrero v. Gates, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (No. 00-7165) (stating bases for motion to dismiss for failure to state a RICO
claim).
171. Accord supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text (discussing minimal acts
required). For example, the LAPD’s purchase of a police cruiser manufactured outof-state would seem to suffice, as would the department’s purchase of insurance
coverage from a national carrier or even simply placing an out of state telephone call
from the Rampart division headquarters.
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the same opportunity.
By passing RICO (both criminal and civil), Congress intended both
to redress wrongs wrought by racketeering activity and to eliminate
such activity through sweeping new prohibitions, remedies, and
172
Indeed, the purpose of RICO was to provide not just
sanctions.
173
174
“enhanced sanctions,” but “new remedies” with which to fight
175
organized crime. As discussed below, RICO has expanded beyond
targeting only organized crime.
While perhaps most people think of criminal sanctions in the
RICO context, the earliest inceptions of the law envisioned civil
176
177
remedies. Civil RICO creates elements that have no common law
178
179
counterparts.
Coupled with section 1962, the general RICO
prohibitions, civil RICO provides a powerful framework for
180
181
plaintiffs. Provisions for nationwide service of process, recovery of
182
183
treble damages, and attorney’s fees, make civil RICO an attractive

172. See Chappell v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1996) (commenting that
Congress intended to create “a wide array of novel civil and criminal weapons” by
enacting RICO).
173. 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4007 (1970).
174. Id.
175. See infra Part II.A (discussing the expansion of RICO beyond organized
crime).
176. See Blakey, supra note 56, at 261 (discussing the legislative history of RICO).
In Senator Hruska’s remarks upon introducing the Criminal Activities Profits Act in
March 1969, President Nixon stated his support for the civil provisions of RICO even
before the final law reached his desk. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime:
Hearings on S. 30, S. 994, Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 449-50 (1969).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. 2000). The Act reads, in pertinent part:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself
of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including,
but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate
or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Id.
178. See Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing no
common law counterparts exist for certain civil RICO elements).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994 & Supp. 2000) (delineating complete text of section
provided supra note 80).
180. See Dana Wolff, The Frontier of RICO Standing: Interpreting RICO’s Conspiracy
Provision to Realize Congress’ Goal of Creating a Powerful Crime-Fighting Weapon, 21 J.
LEGIS. 147 (1995) (commenting, “RICO is like a double-barreled shotgun aimed at
criminal enterprises; the government keeps a finger on the criminal trigger, and
private plaintiffs stand ready to shoot with the civil trigger.”).
181. See Wichita Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Landmark Group, Inc., 674 F. Supp.
321, 325 (D. Kan. 1987) (observing RICO provides for nationwide service of
process).
182. Civil RICO provides, “[a]ny person injured . . . shall recover threefold the
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184

statute for the plaintiff’s attorney.

A. Not Just for Gangsters
185

RICO’s broad language is not unconstitutionally vague and
186
187
This
courts liberally construe the statute, as Congress intended.
expansive construction allows RICO to reach well beyond the Cosa
188
189
Nostra context. Indeed, legislators never intended RICO to apply
190
solely to organized crime in the traditional sense of the term. As a
result of this broad interpretation, criminal RICO is used not just
191
against mafia
but also against all manner of illegal activity,
192
193
government corruption,
and
including white-collar crime,

damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing for recovery of treble
damages and attorney’s fees). Interestingly, civil RICO’s treble damages are not
considered punitive but compensatory and have been held not to violate the
excessive fines prohibition of the Eighth Amendment. See also Liquid Air Corp. v.
Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1310 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding fines not excessive and
commenting that “they are largely compensatory in the special sense that they ensure
that wrongs will be redressed in light of the recognized difficulties of itemizing
damages”).
184. See Patton, supra note 165, at 381 (observing provision for treble damages led
to increase of civil RICO suits). The reader will note again that a conviction under
criminal RICO is not required for a civil suit to proceed under section 1964. See
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
185. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that
the broad definition of “enterprise” includes legitimate as well as illegitimate
businesses and is not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d
1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding enterprise definition in RICO not
unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412-13 (6th Cir.
1981) (holding conduct provisions of RICO not unconstitutionally vague).
186. See United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135-36 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding
RICO should be liberally construed); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 n.7
(7th Cir. 1977) (calling for a broad reading of Rico).
187. See Organized Crime, supra note 56, at 947 (stating RICO “shall be liberally
construed”).
188. See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTACK ON LA COSA NOSTRA (1998) (using the term Cosa Nostra
to refer to the mafia).
189. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-50 (1989)
(holding “pattern of racketeering activity” is properly interpreted broadly so that
defendant need not be involved in organized crime as the term is traditionally
understood).
190. See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 248-50 (applying RICO to a defendant not involved
in traditional forms of organized crime).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming
conviction of members of the Philadelphia Nicodemo Scarfo family who were in
violation of Rico).
192. See Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 142, at 695 (referring to white collar
crime prosecutions pursuant to RICO).
193. See Gerald E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 734-35 (1987) (observing that thirty percent of RICO prosecutions target
alleged government corruption); see also cases cited by id. at 736-37 (including:
United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1983) (targeting a judge); United
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194

prostitution rings. The number of predicate offenses has expanded
195
196
since 1970, and the list is indeed extensive.
197
As with criminal RICO’s expansion beyond organized crime, civil
198
This expansion was not
RICO has enlarged in scope and reach.
199
without its critics and the Supreme Court’s willingness to expand
RICO in the civil context does not match its enthusiasm to do so in
200
the criminal sphere.
Nevertheless, it has been successful, with

States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983) (targeting mayor and other Union
City, N.J. officials)).
194. See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing motel
operators targeted for involvement in bribery of law enforcement to facilitate
prostitution business operating on premises).
195. See Naranjo & Pina, supra note 56, at 26 (providing a legislative history of
RICO).
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing definition of
“racketeering activity,” which includes but is not limited to, murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery and extortion); see also supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text (providing overview of requirements for RICO violation).
197. See United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 137 (1985) (holding RICO
applicable to enterprises that are legitimate as well as to enterprises that are
illegitimate. Here, the enterprise was the county circuit court); see also A. Laxmidas
Sawkar, From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1133,
1134 (1999) (noting RICO “has gone far beyond its original organized crime
limitation”).
198. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1984) (observing,
“[i]nstead of being used against mobsters and organized criminals, [RICO] has
become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against respected and legitimate
enterprises) (internal quotations omitted) (citing findings of court below, Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 487 (1984)); see also Sawkar, supra note 197, at
1134 n.5 (citing Kentucky Laborers Dist. Council Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 755, 770 (W.D. Ky. 1998), which allowed civil
RICO suit against tobacco companies); Nat’l Org. of Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510
U.S. 249, 262 (1994) (allowing civil RICO suit against members of anti-abortion
group by explaining that the application of Rico in situations not specifically
anticipated by Congress is a demonstration of breadth and not ambiguity)); see
generally Organized Crime, supra note 56, at 947 (providing key language central to
RICO’s continued expansion: “[t]he provisions of . . . [RICO] shall be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes”).
199. See, e.g., Naranjo & Pina, supra note 56, at 58 (asserting that “[t]he expansive
uses of RICO in the civil arena continue to have devastating results”); see also Faisal
Shah, Broadening the Scope of Civil RICO: Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 20 U.S.F. L.
REV. 339, 341 (1986) (observing that many courts, fearing abuse of the statute,
“created limitations to narrow its reach”). See generally id. at 341-42 n.13 (citing
several cases imposing limits on the RICO statute: Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 556
F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Harper v. New Japan Secs. Int’l Inc., 545 F. Supp.
1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1125, 1137-38 n.12 (D. Mass. 1982); Landmark Sav. v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209
(E.D. Mich. 1981)). Generally, these courts imposed a stricter construction of RICO
and more narrow interpretation of the legislative history.
200. See Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 142, at 669-70 (observing the Court has
liberally interpreted RICO for criminal cases, but “generally restricted the scope of
the Act” in the civil sphere); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)
(applying a liberal interpretation of RICO in criminal case); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1980) (using a broader reading of RICO); see supra note 189,
at 229 (construing RICO elements more narrowly in civil case context).

RAGLANDPP.DOC

164

12/4/2001 11:50 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:139

201

With the Supreme Court at times
courts allowing broad leeway.
202
203
expanding and at times limiting civil RICO’s reach, however,
tension regarding its proper scope remains. Despite this tension, civil
RICO is both an appropriate and sustainable avenue to address a
long-standing pattern of police corruption and misconduct.
B. Good for the Goose
Courts readily advance criminal RICO prosecutions for police
204
misconduct, and law enforcement offices can certainly constitute
205
RICO enterprises. Legitimate organizations generally may serve as
206
RICO enterprises in criminal actions pursuant to RICO. Further, as
demonstrated in Ruiz, the entire enterprise (e.g., majority of officers
at a site) need not be complicit in the racketeering activity to

201. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (holding Congress intended to reach both
legitimate and illegitimate businesses with RICO and approving of the use of RICO
in “everyday fraud cases”); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87 (holding RICO reaches
legitimate and illegitimate businesses). In fact, even when the target is one not
expressly foreseen by Congress, RICO actions have succeeded. See Haroco, Inc. v.
Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1984) (“[The] fact that
RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.”). See generally Shah, supra note
199, at 341-42 (noting that with Sedima, the Supreme Court eliminated courtimposed limitations on civil RICO, thus “broaden[ing] the scope”).
202. See Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256-62 (1994) (holding
that since RICO does not require an economic or profit-seeking non-economic
racketeering offenses are sufficient to state a claim for civil RICO).
203. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 177-79, 186 (holding that to be liable of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), one must “participate” in the operation or management
of the racketeering enterprise); see also Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 142, at
698-99 (arguing that the management or control test adopted in Reves will limit
criminal prosecution under RICO).
204. See United States v. Davis, 707 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding a county
sheriff’s office is an enterprise under criminal RICO, and that an action pursuant to
the Act can be maintained); United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding the Chicago Police Department an appropriate RICO enterprise);
Blackwood, 768 F.2d at 137-38 (holding criminal RICO provides basis for convicting a
police officer who, among other misconduct, sought bribes in exchange for
influencing criminal cases pending in traffic court); Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 503-04
(affirming conviction of police officer pursuant to criminal RICO for furthering drug
trafficking). But see State v. Nunez, 981 P.2d 738, 743 (Idaho 1999) (holding thefts
by an officer of drugs and money was not sufficient to support a RICO charge
because they were not committed “in the course of” defendant’s duties).
205. See Ruiz, 905 F.3d at 503 (observing that the Lawrence, Massachusetts, police
department qualified as an “enterprise” under RICO, a fact to which the parties
stipulated); Davis, 707 F.2d at 882-83 (holding that a county sheriff’s office was a
RICO “enterprise”); Blackwood, 768 F.2d at 137-38 (holding county circuit court
constitutes an enterprise under RICO).
206. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580, 593 (noting that the plain language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) could include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, and holding
both legitimate and illegitimate organizations can constitute RICO enterprises); see
also United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 994-95 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that a
state governor’s office constitutes a RICO “enterprise,” as well as any other
governmental office).
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207

In Ruiz, the court found the police
maintain a prosecution.
department an appropriate RICO enterprise and held that the
pattern of racketeering activity required by the statute was established
even though a single officer acted essentially alone, without
208
complicity of the department as a whole. In the Guerrero civil suit,
209
substantially more prevalent and severe misconduct appears than in
the aforementioned criminal prosecutions against corrupt officers.
C. Good for the Gander
Precedent from criminal RICO and civil RICO cases do apply to
each other because both the criminal and civil sections of the Act
210
share substantive definitions of what constitutes a violation.
Further, civil RICO not only compensates parties for personal
injuries, but also transforms injured parties into prosecutors, and
211
As
thereby bolsters government efforts to eliminate racketeering.
the consent decree in Los Angeles demonstrates, local authorities
appear, at times, incapable of rooting out police corruption and
212
abuse. In fact, Los Angeles is not an isolated case. The Department
of Justice has successfully negotiated consent decree oversight with
213
three other police forces, and continues to investigate apparent
214
patterns of misconduct in several others.

207. See Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 501-02 (describing the illegal acts of the defendant and
several named accomplices).
208. See id. at 503-04 (explaining that despite the lack of complicity of others in
the department, the defendant’s illegal acts “were inextricably intertwined with his
authority and activities as an employee” of the said “enterprise”—the police
department—and, therefore, the jury could reasonably “find a snug fit between
defendant’s acts and the enterprise”).
209. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text (discussing allegations of illegal
conduct in the Rampart scandal).
210. See Slattery v. Costello, 586 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that
case law “generated through judicial construction” of criminal RICO applies to civil
RICO); see also Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 142, at 670 n.9 (noting that a
court’s holding in a civil RICO case will apply to a criminal RICO case and vice
versa).
211. See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (stating that Congress intended
for RICO to not only compensate victims, but also to encourage suits by injured
parties for the purpose of eliminating racketeering activity); Klehr v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997) (noting a purpose of RICO is to encourage private
plaintiffs to investigate potential infractions); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (stating RICO was passed by Congress to provide
damages and fees to those economically injured by racketeering, and to create
“private attorneys general” to address the infrequently litigated problem).
212. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing the persistence of
problems within the LAPD).
213. See Booth, supra note 32 (reporting consent decrees have been negotiated
with the New Jersey State Police and forces in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and
Steubenville, Ohio).
214. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
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Civil RICO’s private plaintiff involvement is of special importance
given the reluctance of prosecutors to charge police officers for
215
In addition to prosecutors’ general disinclination to
misconduct.
216
some jurisdictions enact
file charges against police officers,
procedural roadblocks, further lessening the likelihood of
217
indictments against police officers.
Georgia law, for example,
provides special rights to police officers accused of misconduct on
218
These privileges include right to counsel in grand jury
the job.
219
proceedings and advanced notice of charges.
The barriers to
prosecution of police misconduct necessarily force injured parties
seeking redress into the civil sphere.

Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 815-16 (1999) (reporting the Department of
Justice is monitoring or investigating forces in: Orange County, Florida; New
Orleans, Louisiana; East Point, Michigan; Buffalo, New York; New York, New York;
Washington, D.C.; Charleston, West Virginia; and Columbus, Ohio).; see also Booth,
supra note 32 (reporting investigations into forces in Washington, D.C., New Orleans,
La., and “five other municipalities”).
215. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 85-86 (discussing prosecutorial
reluctance to charge police officers and attributing it to, inter alia, the close working
relationship typical between prosecutors and police, and the difficulty of proving the
case); see also id. at 85 (discussing Human Rights Watch’s conclusion that police
misconduct prosecutions are uncommon); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE,
ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 198 (1993) (citing
comments of experts on police abuse that criminal law usually fails to enforce
appropriate professional standards). Accord Steve Mills, U.S. Police Brutality Indictments
Prove Rare, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1997, at N1 (reporting that during one year in Chicago,
only twenty two charges were filed based on police misconduct, even though the
Federal Bureau of Investigations formally investigated 2,619 alleged incidents of
abuse).
216. See Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 153 (1998)
(noting the scant resources prosecutors generally afford prosecutions against police
and the reluctance of prosecutors to initiate such proceedings). Los Angeles, for
example, saw only three federal prosecutions of police misconduct brought between
1981 and 1991. See id. at 154 (citing Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal
Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 537
(1994)).
217. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 87 (describing special procedures
afforded officers that create one barrier to prosecutions against police).
218. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-52 (1997 & Supp. 2000) (entitled, “Procedure for
indictment of peace officer for crime in performance of duties; notification; rights of
officer”).
219. The statute provides:
Before an indictment against a peace officer charging the officer with a
crime which is alleged to have occurred while he or she was in the
performance of his or her duties is returned by a grand jury, the officer shall
be notified of the contemplated action by the district attorney . . . and the
officer shall be afforded the rights provided in Code Section 45-11-4
[providing right to counsel and other protections in grand jury
proceedings].
. . . subsection (a) . . . shall apply to all prosecutions, whether for
misdemeanors or felonies, and no such prosecution shall proceed either in
state or superior court without a grand jury indictment.
Id. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 45-11-4 (1990 & Supp. 2000) (providing referenced
grand jury protections).

RAGLANDPP.DOC

2001]

12/4/2001 11:50 AM

USING THE MASTER’S TOOLS

167

III. INADEQUACIES OF SECTION 1983
Generations of legal commentators have sounded alarms over the
220
The fact
ineffectiveness of civil remedies for police misconduct.
that successful civil suits against police officers were sparse six
221
decades ago
is not surprising. However, the persistence of
222
misconduct, and the ineffectiveness of both criminal and civil law to
223
stem the tide underscore the need for a new approach.
224
Section 1983 is the most common means to redress police
225
misconduct. However, the remedies it provides and the difficulties
226
of section 1983 litigation, make it insufficient to tackle the problem.
Civil RICO, on the other hand, has many benefits over section 1983,
and provides a means to overcome the common barriers faced by
227
This Part will briefly
injured plaintiffs suing errant officers.
examine section 1983, explain its limitations, and detail the potential
of civil RICO to provide remedies and reform where section 1983 has
failed.
228
Section 1983’s pedigree dates back to 1871.
Congress has

220. See Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 493 (1955) (noting, generally, that civil remedies have not been effective at
addressing police misconduct); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346-53 (1936) (explaining why civil
liability for illegal arrests is illusive); Edward J. Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police
Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 369
(1981) (observing that the low likelihood of recovery is a disincentive for potential
plaintiffs to file civil suits against police); Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse:
Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 75567 (1993) (reviewing the difficulties of police misconduct suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Miller, supra note 216, at 155 (discussing difficulty of prevailing in a § 1983
police misconduct suit and the ineffectiveness of civil damages to prompt reform).
221. See Hall, supra note 220 (stating that civil remedies for illegal arrests are rare,
and discussing reasons why).
222. See Miller, supra note 216, at 149 (noting the “disturbing frequency” of
incidents of police misconduct nationwide); see also id. at n.5 (detailing surveys
reporting the prevalence of use of excessive force by police).
223. See Miller, supra note 216, at 152 (commenting that both civil and criminal
law “have proven conspicuously ineffective at policing the police”).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
225. See AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra note 45, at § 3.7, 3-81 (observing that most civil
suits alleging police misconduct are federal suits pursuant to § 1983); see also Miller,
supra note 216, at 155 (same).
226. See infra notes 240-259 and accompanying text (discussing insufficiencies of
section 1983 suits).
227. See infra notes 263-279 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of civil
RICO).
228. Section 1983 grew out of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. See Act of Apr. 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The 1871 Act reads:
[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any
person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
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Despite
subsequently both broadened and limited its scope.
many decades of use, however, the promise of section 1983 as a tool
231
against police misconduct remains unfulfilled.
While this is not a
232
Comment about section 1983, per se, an examination of problems
arising from section 1983 suits against police is necessary to
233
understand the potential benefits of civil RICO.
Many difficulties with section 1983 suits result from cultural and
234
Primary among these is the
systemic barriers for the plaintiff.
235
difficulty of finding an attorney to take the case,
especially

the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in
any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such
proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the
United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon
error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts . . . .
Id.
The language of section 1983 closely mirrors this earlier Act:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
229. See Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (amending section
1983 to permit such civil rights suits in the District of Columbia).
230. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c),
110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (amending section 1983 to require a declaratory judgment
before any injunctive relief against a judicial officer can be obtained).
231. See Patton, supra note 220, at 807-08 (commenting that “even successful
section 1983 suits do not seem to deter misconduct”); see also supra notes 206-208 and
accompanying text (discussing the First Circuit’s findings in United States v. Ruiz).
232. For excellent discussions of section 1983, its elements, and its inherent
problems, see Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17 (2000); Patton, supra note 220. But
see Adam S. Lurie, Ganging Up On Police Brutality: Municipal Liability for the
Unconstitutional Actions of Multiple Police Officers Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2087 (2000) (advancing for a slightly more optimistic examination of section
1983).
233. This Comment also does not directly address criminal causes of action
against abusive police officers. While prosecutions are rare, there is a dim light
flickering. The recently enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141 gives new powers to the U.S.
Department of Justice, including the force of consent decrees such as those imposed
upon Los Angeles. However, the law is too new for any conclusions as to its impact.
For a comprehensive discussion of § 14141, see Miller, supra note 216.
234. See Patton, supra note 220, at 755-96 (discussing three primary obstacles
facing plaintiffs).
235. See Gilles, supra note 232, at 20 (observing section 1983 “has . . . failed to live
up to its promise” of ending police misconduct); see also AVERY & RUDOVSKY, supra
note 45, § 4.5, at 4-9 (commenting that “unless the plaintiff has suffered substantial
injuries” significant damages are unlikely), cited in Patton, supra note 220, at 755
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236

considering the lack of means for the typical victim of abuse.
237
Further, juries are typically heavily biased in favor of the police, and
238
the “code of silence” creates another substantial stumbling block
239
Yet, societal attitudes and police culture are not the
for plaintiffs.
only barriers to section 1983 success.
A. Section 1983 Poses Significant Pleading Burdens
Liability of individual officers under section 1983 is also
problematic, given the requirement that the officer knew, or should
240
have known, he was violating a citizen’s constitutional rights.
Further, the standard of measuring the egregiousness of the alleged
241
acts differs according to constitutional basis of the claim.
If the misconduct allegedly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is not enough for the officers to display deliberate indifference to
242
Rather, only conduct that “shocks the
fundamental rights.
243
conscience” is actionable in that instance.
Section 1983 claims
arising from other bases, such as the Eighth Amendment, may
require a lesser burden for the plaintiff, such as deliberate
244
indifference. However, this lower burden is perhaps in reality not

n.12.
236. See Irving Joyner, Litigating Police Misconduct Claims in North Carolina, 19 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 113, 113 (1991) (stating people of color are more likely victims of police
misconduct that whites); see also Patton, supra note 220, at 756 (observing that poor
African-American or Latino men are the most common victims of police abuse).
237. See Littlejohn, supra note 220, at 426 (stating that jury bias is a primary factor
in the difficulty of prevailing in police misconduct cases). As U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski observed, “[b]y and large the courts are
just normal people. They have a tendency to be skeptical of people who say they
were abused by the police,” quoted in Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence, 77 A.B.A. J.,
July, 1991, at 45, 48 (1991).
238. This term refers to the refusal of fellow officers to report abusive conduct of
their colleagues. See generally CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 9, at 16871 (discussing the code of silence within the LAPD); Patton, supra note 220, at 763-64
(discussing the code of silence).
239. See Patton, supra note 220, at 763-64 (discussing the problems presented by
the code of silence).
240. See generally Young v. Mt. Ranier, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1328, at 7 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussing the standard that officers either actually be aware of facts, or be
able to draw an inference, that a substantial risk of serious harm exists); Giarrusso v.
Chicago, 539 F. Supp. 690, 693 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (discussing allegations that police
officers “knew or should have known” conduct violated constitutional rights).
241. See Young, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1328, at 15-17 (explaining that the “know or
should have known” standard as it relates to an officer’s “deliberate indifference” to
potential harm).
242. See Young, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 1328, at 15-17 (adding the requirement of
egregious police conduct to the “deliberate indifference” standard).
243. See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (stating that for a “half
century now[,] we have spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as
that which shocks the conscience”).
244. See Young, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1328, at 17-19 (discussing Supreme Court
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significantly different from the “shocks the conscience” requirement
245
Further, even
of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations.
with proof that a use of force, an arrest, or other conduct was illegal,
246
an officer can claim a defense that he acted in good-faith.
A
plaintiff in Guerrero’s shoes, therefore, confronts multiple burdens
to stating a cognizable section 1983 claim, even with definitive proof
of illegal conduct.
B. Municipal Liability Nearly Beyond Reach
Under section 1983, it is nearly impossible to hold police
247
departments or municipalities liable for constitutional violations
Even naming chiefs of police or supervisory officers not directly
involved in the misconduct is nearly impossible. To hold a policymaker liable pursuant to section 1983, the plaintiff must first show
the official deliberately ignored the risk that an officer, or many
248
officers, may violate citizens’ rights. A police chief’s failure to train
officers properly, therefore, is not actionable unless the chief knew
249
such failure would likely lead to abuse.
The United States Supreme Court greatly heightened this standard
250
in Bryan County Board of Commissioners v. Brown. In Bryan County, the

precedent that prison officials violate the Eight Amendment when they show
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s health needs).
245. See Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating, “[d]eliberate
indifference, in fact, is merely the manifestation in certain situations of a more
general inquiry, which is whether the government conduct at issue ‘shocks the
conscience’”).
246. See Miller, supra note 216, at 155 (discussing the availability of a good faith
defense in section 1983 actions).
247. See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 1275, 1331 (1999) (offsetting court decisions limiting systematic liability against
municipalities with the intent of section 1983, which was to protect the powerless).
248. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1989) (establishing and
discussing the deliberate indifference standard). In Canton, the plaintiff’s suit
alleged she did not receive required medical care while in police custody, and that
this failure amounted to a section 1983 violation because the municipality provided
no training to officers so they could determine when care is required. Canton, 489
U.S. at 389-92. The trial court found for the plaintiff, and the verdict survived
through the federal court of appeals. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
reversed and remanded, holding failure to train is only actionable pursuant to
section 1983 when it demonstrates deliberate indifference to citizens’ rights. Id.
249. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 394 (O’Conner, J., concurring) (agreeing with the
majority that municipal conduct did not rise to the level of purposeful neglect, or
deliberate indifference, but parting with the majority on its decision to remand).
250. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (vacating lower
court judgment against County for hiring a deputy with previous misdemeanor
convictions for assault and battery). In Brown, the plaintiff was injured when a
county deputy pulled her from a vehicle following a police chase. Id. Brown claimed
that the sheriff inadequately screened the deputy for prior convictions and thus
violated section 1983 because the deputy had a history of misdemeanor convictions,
including one for assault and battery. Id. At trial, the county was held liable, and this
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Court held that to establish liability of supervisory officers not directly
involved in misconduct, a section 1983 plaintiff must show not only
deliberate indifference of likely constitutional violations, but also
indifference to the risk that the particular officer was “likely to inflict
251
Therefore, for Guerrero to prevail
the particular injury suffered.”
in his section 1983 claim against named supervisors and former chiefs
of police, he must prove they deliberately ignored the risk that the
officers who arrested him not only would act illegally, but would
252
commit the specific acts he alleges.
The possibility of municipal liability for injunctive relief under
253
In
section 1983 was virtually eliminated with Los Angeles v. Lyons.
Lyons, the Supreme Court denied standing to a plaintiff challenging
the common use of chokeholds by Los Angeles Police Department
254
officers. Even though Lyons was rendered unconscious and had his
larynx damaged by the unjustified use of a chokehold, and evidence
255
demonstrated that such illegal holds would continue, standing for
an injunction barring the use of such restraint was denied because he
could not show a concrete likelihood that he personally would again
256
be stopped and choked. Injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983
is not available to Guerrero, therefore, unless he can demonstrate he
personally is likely to again be arrested and again suffer the same
violations of constitutional rights.
C. Minimal Statute of Limitations
Actions pursuant to section 1983 are governed by the applicable
257
forum state’s statute of limitations for the specific harm alleged.

verdict withstood en banc hearing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however vacated the judgment below and remanded,
holding that liability can only attach if the sheriff consciously disregarded an obvious
risk that hiring the deputy would result in an excessive use of force. Board, 520 U.S.
at 399-400.
251. Board, 520 U.S. at 412 (explaining that the “connection between the
background of the particular applicant and the specific Constitutional violation
alleged must be strong”).
252. See Plaintiff’s Opposition, supra note 49, at 1 (setting forth allegations of civil
rights violations).
253. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
254. Id. at 97-98 (describing the use of the holds, which impede blood-flow to the
brain by suppressing the carotid artery).
255. Id. at 108 (stating, “it may be that among the countless encounters between
the police and the citizens of a great city such as Los Angeles, there will be certain
instances in which strangleholds will be illegally applied and injury and death
unconstitutionally inflicted on the victim.”).
256. Id. at 111 (stating that the equitable relief of an injunction against the city is
unavailable to Lyons unless he can demonstrate that he personally “will again be
wronged in a similar way”).
257. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (finding that, though Federal
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Excessive use of force and other police misconduct claims, therefore,
are likely governed by the forum’s personal injury statute of
258
limitations. This, of course, creates varied time-frames for bringing
suit, and as little as one year may pass before an injured party is time259
barred.
D. Section 1983 Insufficient
Simply put, section 1983 provides little hope of forcing systemic
change upon police departments plagued with misconduct and
260
abuse.
Section 1983 jurisprudence creates a situation where, in
most instances, neither the police department nor the individual
261
Section 1983, therefore, leaves
officer is subject to liability.
plaintiffs in Guerrero’s position with scant opportunity for either
compensation for injuries or for forcing reform upon police
departments.
IV. THE HOPE OF CIVIL RICO
While there is no caselaw except for Guerrero on the use of civil
262
RICO against police officers and departments, potential benefits of
the statute can be identified by examining general RICO
jurisprudence. To finalize the basis for this Comment’s conclusions,
this section expands upon Part I’s discussion of civil RICO elements.
With the problems of section 1983 as a backdrop, this segment
explains how the thorny “intent” element of section 1983 is reduced
under civil RICO. Further, statute of limitations problems inherent
in constitutional torts fade away under this new theory of police
liability. Finally, the powerful treble damage provisions of civil RICO

law governs the “characterization” of a section 1983 claim, i.e., as a personal injury
claim, state law then controls the statute of limitations for that area of law).
258. See McDougal v. Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
section 1983 claims in California are subject to California’s statute of limitations for
personal injury torts).
259. See McDougal, 942 F.2d at 673-74 (stating California personal injury statute of
limitations is one year). Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 2000)
(providing the applicable statutory language for the one-year statute of limitations),
with Wilson, 471 U.S. at 263 (stating New Mexico’s personal injury statute of
limitations is three years).
260. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 478 (4th ed. 2000)
(commenting: “[w]hile § 1983, on its face, is the appropriate statute for challenging
police departments and other local governmental agencies and for requesting
equitable relief, the Court’s jurisprudence has closed the avenue of relief”).
261. See id. (explaining that Monroe v. Pape, 1 U.S. 167 (1966), effectively
eliminated municipal liability under section 1983, while Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967), destroyed individual section 1983 liability in the police misconduct context).
262. See Booth, supra note 32 (explaining that the Guerrero case is the first instance
of such a claim proceeding).
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are examined.
A. Intent
263

RICO, civil or criminal, contains no intent element. Rather, the
intent required for RICO purposes is only that necessary for
264
committing the predicate acts themselves. This remains true even if
265
the predicate acts are not specific intent crimes. To hold an officer
266
who extorts a citizen as part of a racketeering pattern or practice
liable under civil RICO, therefore, the plaintiff must only prove an
intent to extort. Further, a good faith defense like that available for
267
268
section 1983 suits, appears inapplicable to RICO.
Plaintiffs such
as Guerrero, therefore, can more likely prove culpable intent of the
officers under civil RICO than under prevailing means of addressing
police misconduct.
B. Statute of Limitations
In 1987, the Supreme Court resolved conflicting authority
regarding the civil RICO statute of limitations, applying a four-year
269
period to all such claims.
The limitations period begins running
270
when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his injury.

263. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing the elements of a
RICO violation).
264. See United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the
mens rea required for RICO is no different from that required for the predicate
offense), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
265. See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
because underlying predicate racketeering act does not demand showing of intent to
violate law, “the defendants can be guilty of conspiring to violate RICO even if they
were not aware their actions were illegal”).
266. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing RICO pattern element).
267. See Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 459-62 (1978)
(discussing the section 1983 good faith defense).
268. For example, it is unlikely a court would accept a RICO defendant’s claim
that he did illegally engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, but had a good faith
belief that racketeering was not illegal.
269. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146-52
(1987) (concluding that, though state statutes of limitations are typically controlling
where the federal and state laws are similar, where another federal law bears a closer
resemblance, the federal statute of limitations will be controlling). See generally Ann
K. Wooster, Annotation, Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions for Damages under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, 156
A.L.R. FED. 361 (1999) (examining tolling and other issues in civil RICO statute of
limitations jurisprudence).
270. See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 552-53 (2000) (declaring the rule as the statute of
limitation begins running when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered,
the injury). Rotella sought to resolve the confusion about accrual of the civil RICO
limitations period. Prior to the case, in some jurisdictions accrual did not begin until
the plaintiff also discovered the existence of racketeering pattern. Id. at 535-55.
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Thus, pleading civil RICO provides plaintiffs, such as Guerrero, with
a significant statute of limitations, allowing more time to identify
defendants, build the case, and perform other tasks necessary for a
successful suit. If Guerrero sued in California state court, for
271
Absent
example, he would face a one-year statute of limitations.
equitable tolling, therefore, the majority of Guerrero’s claims would
272
have been time-barred if brought pursuant to California law.
C. Damages: Triple Threat
273

The proviso for treble damages is perhaps the most powerful of
274
Indeed, providing such substantial
all civil RICO provisions.
damages was a key means by which Congress intended to cripple
275
RICO targets. In the course of the Rampart scandal, this provision
could set Los Angeles’ liability at as much as six-hundred million
276
dollars.
As civil damages are seen as a fundamental tool to force reform
277
upon resistant police forces, use of RICO could greatly increase the
likelihood of fundamental change. Further, given the general
difficulty of bringing a suit against a police officer for kidnapping,
278
bribery, extortion, and other forms of misconduct, the possibility of

271. See Sanchez, supra note 48 (reporting that the statute of limitations for
Guerrero under California law is one year). See generally Wooster, supra note 269
(discussing issues regarding accrual of civil RICO statute of limitations).
272. He was allegedly abused in 1997 and filed suit three years later. While
equitable tolling remains possible, it adds an additional burden. See Plaintiff’s
Opposition, supra note 49, at 1; see also Sanchez, supra note 48 (reporting that
Guerrero was arrested in November 1997).
273. Civil RICO provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no
person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud
in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
274. See Kobylak, supra note 72, at 545 (asserting that the “most significant”
provision of § 1964(c) is the provision for treble damages).
275. See Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391, 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), later proceeding at 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that the treble
damages provision most significant aspect of the act); see also Kobylak, supra note 72,
at 545 (observing that the “potency” of treble damages underscores congressional
intent to create a powerful “arsenal of weapons” in civil RICO).
276. See Sanchez, supra note 48 (observing that before the possibility of RICO suits
was raised by Guerrero, Los Angeles city officials were estimating one-hundred to twohundred million dollars in potential civil liability as a result of the Rampart scandal).
277. See generally sources listed supra note 220 (discussing efforts to recover civil
damages for police misconduct).
278. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 37 (discussing inability of both
civil and criminal law to stem the tide of rampant police misconduct throughout the
nation).
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not only treble damages but also recovery of fees
greater number of injured parties to seek redress.

may well enable a

V. MORE HARM THAN GOOD?
While promising, civil RICO is not necessarily a panacea. In City of
280
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court insulated
281
municipalities from punitive damages under section 1983.
Commenting that “considerations of history and policy do not
support exposing a municipality to punitive damages for the bad-faith
282
actions of its officials,” the Court erected a prudential barrier that
283
remains intact.
284
Debate over the value and scope of this judgment persists, but
285
286
In City of Newport, the Supreme
the principle is well-established.
Court reasoned that section 1983 punitive awards against
municipalities do not deter constitutional torts more effectively than
287
damage awards against the individual actor. Additionally, the Court
ruled that punitive damages against municipalities unfairly penalize
288
taxpayers.
289
Of course, civil RICO does not provide for punitive damages, and

279. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & 1999) (providing for recovery of “reasonable
attorney’s fees” in Rico cases).
280. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
281. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 271 (refusing to award punitive damages,
absent compelling circumstances, against the municipality).
282. Id.
283. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended to cities
almost complete immunity from section 1983 punitive damages claims. See Ciraolo v.
City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir.) (holding city immune from section
1983 punitive damage claim), cert. denied, 2000 WL 1376675 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000).
284. See Constitutional Law—Section 1983—Second Circuit Holds That Punitive
Damages Are Unavailable Against Municipalities: Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d
236 (2d Cir. 2000), Cert. Denied, 2000 WL 1376675 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2000), 114 HARV. L.
REV. 666 (2000) [hereinafter Constitutional Law] (discussing conflicting perspectives
on the scope of municipal section 1983 immunity); Daryl Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345 (2000) (for a compelling economic analysis of constitutional torts applied
to government actors and the internalization of damages among private and public
entities).
285. See Constitutional Law, supra note 284, at 666 (explaining the state of the law
regarding municipal punitive liability pursuant to section 1983).
286. Decided June 1981.
287. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 269-70 (asserting that “allowing juries and
courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending
official, based on his personal financial resources” is a better deterrent than punitive
damages because it protects against constitutional encroachment while sparing “the
citizen-taxpayer” the increased cost of a punitive award against the municipality).
288. Id.
289. See Liquid Air, 834 F.2d at 1310 (holding civil RICO damages compensatory
rather than punitive); see also supra note 183 (discussing compensatory nature of
RICO treble damages provision).
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290

However, its treble
does not allow suits against municipalities.
291
damages provision exposes cities as indemnifiers of its police
292
officers and thus to enormous civil liability.
The policy
underpinnings for forbidding section 1983 punitive damages against
293
municipalities, therefore, can logically extend to the civil RICO
context.
294
Los Angeles’ expected liability from the Rampart scandal already
295
may impact city services and programs, and increased civil RICO
damages will further tax city coffers. It is possible that civil RICO
awards will diminish city resources so severely that no funds will be
available for the training and oversight needed to clean up the
296
LAPD.
RICO suits, therefore, may unwittingly increase the
likelihood that officers such as those implicated in the Rampart
scandal will remain on the streets.
CONCLUSION
Despite concerted efforts for many years, the Los Angeles Police
Department has resisted reform and persisted in a pattern of severe
misconduct. Numerous other police forces demonstrate similar
resistance to reform and continue tolerating systemic abuse. Decades
of civil suits have failed to achieve reform and criminal law simply
provides scant hope for the injured. Los Angeles demonstrates that
even the most shocking abuses of police power at times evade redress.
Adding insult to decades of injury for Angelenos concerned with
police misconduct, California Superior Court Judge Jacqueline
Conner reversed state criminal convictions of three Rampart officers
297
on December 23, 2000.
In the first criminal trial stemming from

290. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining why municipalities
cannot be sued under RICO).
291. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (providing, “[a]ny person
injured . . . shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . .”).
292. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing Los Angeles’s increased
civil liability resulting from civil RICO suit).
293. See supra notes 281-287 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
behind section 1983 punitive award prohibition).
294. See Booth, supra note 32 (estimating the city’s civil liability from the Rampart
Scandal at $400 million).
295. See id. (reporting that money from the Los Angeles’ tobacco settlement fund
may be used to cover its civil liability from the Rampart scandal).
296. See Levinson, supra note 284, at 370-73 (asserting that constitutional tort
damages against government entities are counterproductive, leading to over
deterrence and increased, rather than decreased, societal costs).
297. See Judge throws out conviction of three officers in L.A. police scandal, at http://
www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/12/23/lapd.corruption.ap/index.html (Dec. 23, 2000)
(reporting the reversal of the officers’ convictions in the Rampart corruption
scandal).
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the Rampart scandal, the three were convicted in November based on
298
As a microcosm,
allegations they conspired to frame suspects.
therefore, Los Angeles demonstrates that traditional legal methods
have not solved pervasive patterns of misconduct by law enforcement.
Civil RICO is an excellent tool to employ in the ongoing effort to
clean up troubled forces. By providing powerful remedies, it may
indeed compel reform within recalcitrant departments. The statute’s
less burdensome culpable intent requirement, laundry list of
predicate acts, provisions for treble damages, extended statute of
limitations, and firmly rooted applicability to many forms of
misconduct seem perfectly-suited for the civil rights plaintiff.
Regardless of Guerrero’s specific outcome, however, he has helped
forge a new tool future plaintiffs may successfully wield. By ruling
Guerrero can proceed with claims the LAPD is a criminal enterprise,
Judge Rea thrust the ongoing pattern of police misconduct onto the
front page. Given jurors’ general bias in favor of police officers, such
news can help level the ground in the jury pool.
In her seminal essay The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the
299
Master’s House, Audrey Lorde cautions the methods of the elite “may
allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never
300
enable us to bring about genuine change.”
The danger that civil
RICO awards will so severely tax municipal resources that they do
more harm than good is real. Perhaps, as Lorde would fear, the civil
RICO tool cannot deliver true reform. Further, only time will tell if
the Supreme Court will impose the prudential barriers of section
1983 onto the civil RICO model. The judiciary’s general support of
criminal RICO prosecutions and an abundance of civil RICO suits in
other spheres bodes well for the viability of civil RICO, however.
Ultimately, perhaps the specter of civil RICO will force law
enforcement to better police itself, taking officers like Perez and the
other implicated Rampart CRASH officers off the street after credible
complaints from citizens and before another Ovando shooting. Even
if civil RICO does not achieve substantive change, at least some
victims of police misconduct may prevail and win relief. Given the
revelations of massive misconduct in Los Angeles, plaintiffs such as
Guerrero need all the tools available in the legal shed.

298. See Three LAPD officers convicted in corruption scandal, at http://www.cnn.
com/2000/LAW/11/15/lapd.verdict.crim (Nov. 15, 2000) (reporting the jury
verdict convicting Sergeants Edward Ortiz and Brian Liddy and Officer Michael
Buchanan of conspiracy).
299. Supra note 1.
300. Id. at 112.

